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with individual performance-related pay, we ﬁnd that the receipt of a range of group-performance schemes
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tional on wage levels, so that paymethods are associated with greater job satisfaction in addition to that coming
from higher wages. We use a variety of methods to control for unobserved individual and job-speciﬁc character-
istics. We suggest that half of the share-capitalism effect is accounted for by employees reciprocating for the
“gift”; we also show that share capitalism helps dampen the negative wellbeing effects of what we typically
think of as “bad” aspects of job quality.
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In the absence of detailed information on job attributes, measures of
workerwellbeing, and in particular job satisfaction, have been proposed
as a potential summary metric of overall job quality (Hamermesh,
2001). There are now a number of contributions that have addressed
the validity of such subjective measures (see Clark et al., 2008; De
Neve et al., 2013). In the cross-section, these have been shown to pre-
dict future objective outcomes, such as life-expectancy and health in
general, marriage, divorce and fertility. In the speciﬁc context of thethe CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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2001; Green, 2010) and retirement (Clark et al., 2015), and wellbeing
has been linked to greater productivity at work (Oswald et al., 2015).
None of these results would be found were subjective scores not to be
comparable to at least a certain extent across individuals.
The use of these types of stated-preference measures has improved
our understanding of howworkers respond to changes in job character-
istics and contractual arrangements. One empirical regularity is that
wages, unsurprisingly, are positively correlated with job satisfaction. A
more recent literature has sought to examine whether the way in
which wages are determined, and in particular performance-pay
schemes that explicitly link compensation to effort and output, also in-
ﬂuence job satisfaction. As discussed below, this literature has largely
focused on individual performance-pay schemes. However, group-
based performance-pay schemes appear to be at least as common as
individual-based performance pay in Europe and the United States
(Bryson et al., 2013). This is the subject of the current paper, which pro-
vides a range of evidence that performance pay, and speciﬁcally group-
payment schemes, has a robust positive impact on job satisfaction.
In standard theoretical models there is a clear connection between
individual performance-based pay and worker wellbeing. The linking
of pay to individual performance aims to compensate workers for the
disutility of effort by setting marginal product and rewards equal. Per-
formance pay hence allowsworkers to choose the effort and pay combi-
nation that maximises their utility (Lazear, 1995). In practice, this may
not occur for a number of reasons. These include workers lacking the
job autonomy to inﬂuence output, or the employer setting the effort–re-
ward ratio to the disadvantage of the worker. In these cases, it has been
suggested that performance pay may actually result in worse worker
wellbeing outcomes, including lowermorale, greater stress and anxiety,
injury, and absenteeism (Bender et al., 2012; Frick et al., 2013).
The effect of group-based payment schemes onworker wellbeing has
attracted less attention, despite these schemes being relatively common.
The theoretical link between group-based performance pay and worker
utility is less clear. For instance, the incentive-based channels discussed
above are likely diluted due to the 1/n problem. It has been argued, how-
ever, thatwhat can be described as ‘Share Capitalist’modes of pay (broad-
ly, in whichworker pay depends on the ﬁrm's fortunes) potentially affect
worker wellbeing through a variety of alternative channels.
Employees with a direct ﬁnancial stake in the ﬁrm, for instance
where pay is linked to ﬁrm proﬁts, may feel more engaged in the
decision-making process within the organization. And even when this
ownership or proﬁt-sharing stake is modest, the ﬁrm's promotion of
such schemes may perform what Bowen and Ostroff (2004: 206) de-
scribe as “a symbolic or signalling function” to communicate a strong
HRM system that is capable of aligning the interests of the organization
and the worker. A second potential channel is that the provision of
workers with an ownership stake in the ﬁrm may be viewed as a form
of gift exchange. Along these lines, Bryson and Freeman (2014) argue
that standard all-employee share-purchase plans are a ‘gift’ from the em-
ployer, since they offer discounted shares, often by giving workers free
shares for every share they buy, up to a limit. This may increase worker
wellbeing through the ‘warm glow’ created by this gift. This may be re-
lated to thevalue of the gift, but even small value paymentsmay increase
wellbeing as they have been shown to inﬂuence worker performance
(Kosfeld and Neckermann, 2011). Additional, less direct, transmission
channels also exist. For instance, it is possible that the high take-up of a
share plan among co-workers positively affect non-members' wellbeing.
Non-members may like having reciprocating types of co-workers, espe-
cially in the case of a positive production externality.
However, it is not guaranteed that group-based paymentwill increase
job satisfaction. One key criticism of the effectiveness of group-based pay-
ment relates to free-riding. In practice, these problems may not manifest
themselves due to increased co-worker peer pressure and co-monitoring
(Kandel and Lazear, 1992), as has been shown in recent empirical work
(Freeman et al., 2010). This is akin to the effects of what Barker (1993)termed the ‘concertive control’ exercised in teams. Whilst this may be
good for the company, a culture of worker co-monitoring focused on en-
couraging greater worker effort has potentially detrimental effects on
worker motivation and job satisfaction (Green and Heywood, 2010). In
addition, group-based payment, in common with performance pay
more generally, exposes workers to greater earnings risk, which may
also be associated with lower wellbeing (Cornelissen et al., 2011).
Group-based paymentmay then inﬂuenceworkerwellbeing in a vari-
ety of ways, including a number that are distinct from the channels pro-
posed for individual performance-related pay schemes. The main focus
of the current paper is to provide estimates of the effect of group-based
payment schemes on job satisfaction in three distinct data settings: a
single-ﬁrm (ShareCo), European cross-sections (EWCS), and a British
panel (the British Household Panel Survey: BHPS). These settings are
complementary insofar as they allow us to disentangle the speciﬁc
forms of group-based payment schemes from other performance-pay
schemes, and to examine their effect on worker wellbeing in narrow
within-job settings. Our approach is to use these three datasets to estab-
lish a credible body of evidence on: (1) the effect of performance-pay
schemes on job satisfaction; (2) theway inwhich performance pay inﬂu-
ences worker dissatisfaction with poor working conditions; and (3) the
spillover effect of performance pay on non-recipients' job satisfaction.
Our main result is that group-based schemes are robustly positively
correlatedwith job satisfaction in all three datasets, and across different
speciﬁcations. By way of contrast, and as a matter of interest, this is not
the case for individual performance-payment schemes. We go on to ex-
plore two possible channels for which our data is well-suited. First, we
examine the potential role of worker reciprocity by focusing on
organisational loyalty and perceptions of fairness, both of which may
be inﬂuenced directly by performance-related pay. The loyalty channel
may especially hold for pay methods such as proﬁt-sharing and share
receipt, where one purpose is to make workers ‘part-owners’ of the
ﬁrm and so view it is a joint enterprise. Second,we askwhetherworkers
in group-payment schemes report smaller falls in wellbeing when ex-
posed to negative employment conditions. We posit that group-
incentive schemes may dampen the negative impact of poor working
conditions on employee wellbeing, via increased loyalty to the ﬁrm or
a feeling of ﬁrm ownership in share-capitalist schemes.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 pre-
sents the existing empirical evidence, and Section 3 describes our data
and empirical approach. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5
then concludes.
2. Empirical evidence
Kruse et al. (2010: 262) review12 contributions in the area, and con-
clude that the evidence on performance pay and worker wellbeing is at
best mixed. We start by highlighting two papers that are most closely
related to our work here.
Green and Heywood (2008) use the BHPS to provide panel data es-
timates (1998–2004) of the effect of performance pay on job satisfaction.
Their focus is on individual performance pay, but they also provide esti-
mates for proﬁt-related pay/bonuses. They ﬁnd the latter are associated
with higher job satisfaction, in both cross-section and panel regressions.
Our analysis of BHPS builds on theirwork by extending the period of anal-
ysis (1998–2008), conditioning on a broader array ofwork characteristics,
and focusing on group-based performance pay. Reﬂecting their focus on
individual performance pay, the estimation sample in Green and
Heywood (2008) includes both private- and public-sector workers.
While individual performance pay has becomemore common in the pub-
lic sector, it is less clear howmany typical forms of group paymentwould
operate in this setting (e.g. the difﬁculty in deﬁning a surplus/proﬁt to be
shared). We focus only on BHPS private-sector workers, where group-
based payment is likely to be salient, and condition on worker-job ﬁxed
effects, whereas Green and Heywood (2008) conﬁne their analysis to
worker ﬁxed effects. Also, we utilise a range of additional variables
3 One potential concern here, particularly in our single-ﬁrm setting, is that individuals
receiving group payments may feel obliged to say that they are more loyal to the ﬁrm,
and perhaps report higher job satisfaction. While we cannot rule this out, it seems less
likely to hold in our two other survey settings which are not connected with ﬁrms in
any way.
4 The ESPP in the UK is a Shareholder Incentive Plan (SIP) that offers tax advantages to
those buying and selling shares, togetherwithmatched shares from theﬁrm(whereby the
ﬁrm gives employees a free share for each share they purchase). For details on the Share
Plan and the surveys see Bryson and Freeman (2010).
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allow us to paint a more complete picture of the relationship between
compensation schemes and job satisfaction.
Kruse et al. (2010) examine the effect of a variety of share-capitalist
type compensation schemes on worker outcomes using two US-based
data sets: the 2002 and 2006 waves of the General Social Survey
(GSS), which is a representative sample of employees at for-proﬁt orga-
nisations, and an NBER survey of 14 companies which have at least one
group-performance scheme. In the GSS no relationship is found be-
tween share-capitalist schemes and job satisfaction. The analogous rela-
tionship in the NBER data is positive, but becomes insigniﬁcant once
company ﬁxed effects are introduced. The same results hold when
stock-option and employee-ownership schemes are examined sepa-
rately. They do however suggest that both proﬁt sharing and gain shar-
ing increase job satisfaction when they are ‘higher-powered’ (i.e. when
the scheme's payment makes up a larger proportion of the worker's
overall compensation).
An alternative to the stated-preference approach of evaluating the
correlation between compensation scheme and worker wellbeing is to
instead consider ‘revealed-preference’ measures. One such measure is
job quitting (see Freeman, 1978; Clark, 2001). Here, the early work of
Blakemore et al. (1987) presents a model predicting that bonuses re-
duce quits and ﬁnds empirical support for it in Panel Survey of Income
Dynamics data; Lakhani (1988) also shows that re-enlistment bonuses
reduced quit rates in the US Army. More recently Bryson and Freeman
(2014) use the single-ﬁrm ShareCo data (whichwe also use here) to re-
veal a negative correlation between share-plan participation and quit
intentions. Kruse et al. (2012) conﬁrm that more high-powered share-
capitalist schemes reduce voluntary turnover and increase the intention
to stay, even among the ‘100 Best Companies to Work For in America’,
where we might expect little variation. The explanation appears to be
a positive association between share capitalism and the quality ofwork-
ing life, as indicated bymore trusting relationswith supervisors, greater
participation in decision making and more information sharing, which
go to make up what they term a ‘more positive workplace culture’.
More broadly, there is a great deal of work suggesting that higher
pay increases satisfaction at work (Bryson et al., 2012) and a substantial
literature conﬁrming Rosen's (1974) contention that higher pay can
compensate workers for poor work conditions. Poor conditions reduce
employee wellbeing (unless they are fully compensated by higher
wages or other beneﬁts). Workers with shares in the company may
however be less concerned about improving conditions if doing so af-
fects their share prices or the size of their proﬁt share; equally they
may identify more closely with the employer than do other employees.
As such, we suspect that the job satisfaction of workers with shares will
be less sensitive to working conditions than that of other employees.
The following section outlines our empirical approach and describes
the three datasets thatwe use to analyse the relationship between share
capitalism and job satisfaction.
3. Data and empirical approach
The key challenge in this literature is the identiﬁcation of the causal ef-
fects of performance pay on worker wellbeing. One particular source of
concern is unobserved worker heterogeneity with respect to ability, dis-
utility of effort, or preferences for risk or reciprocity. The introduction of
performance pay by ﬁrms is associated with potential sorting on the
basis of a range of factors such as those listed above that are generally
not observed indata (Lazear, 1986, 2000). If not accounted for, this sorting
may lead to a positive association between performance pay and employ-
ee wellbeing. At the same time, workers who face constraints on their
ability to choose their preferred compensation package may well be
‘misallocated’. For example, if the number of ﬁrms offering shares to em-
ployees does notmeet employee demand, employeesmay queue for jobs
with share plans, allowing employers to pick from the queue. On the
other hand, performance-related pay is standard in some occupations,so that workers in these occupations have little choice but to accept it as
part of their compensation package. The ideal experiment to establish
the effects of performance pay on worker wellbeing would involve ran-
domly treating individuals, occupations or workplaces within a ﬁrm
with a particular wage or payment method, or randomly taking a person
and moving her to a new ﬁrm with a different pay regime. We do not
have such experimental data here. Our approach is instead to use three
complementary datasets to establish a credible body of evidence on the
link between group payment and job satisfaction. Below we set out our
underlying empirical approach and describe, in turn, how each dataset
is used.
Our basic regression for the relationship between paymentmethods
and job satisfaction is:
JSi ¼ α0PayTypei þ β0Xi þ εi ð1Þ
where Paytypei is a vector of performance-related paymentmethods re-
ceived by worker i, JSi reported job satisfaction and Xi a vector of con-
trols. Job satisfaction has been shown to be a useful predictor of
various work-related behaviours, such as quits (Freeman, 1978; Clark
et al., 1998; Clark, 2001), absenteeism (Clegg, 1983) and productivity
(Mangione and Quinn, 1975; Patterson et al., 1997). As such, it is often
considered to be a viable index of the work-related component of
utility.3 The job satisfaction regressions throughout the paper are esti-
mated using linear techniques, as Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters
(2004) suggest that the difference between cardinal and ordinal estima-
tion of subjective wellbeing is not particularly large.
Other things equal we expect performance-pay workers to earn
more than their ﬁxed pay counterparts because performance pay com-
pensates workers for additional effort. In the absence of controls for
wages, the estimated value of α in (1) combines the effect of perfor-
mance pay, increased wages and job disamenities on job satisfaction.
Potentially more interesting is the conditional effect of performance
pay holding wages constant, as in the following equation:
JSi ¼ α0PayTypei þ β0Xi þ λWagei þ εi ð2Þ
The estimated value of α in Eq. (2) now picks up any effect of
performance-related pay that does not come via wages. We estimate
pooled and panel variants of these equations in three different data
sets. The panel regressions allow any individual differences in response
style to be controlled for. As it turns out, all of these different speciﬁca-
tions and datasets produce qualitatively very similar ﬁndings.
3.1. Dataset 1: ShareCo
Our ﬁrst dataset is single-ﬁrm. The company, ShareCo (a pseudo-
nym), is a multinational business services corporation employing
roughly 12,000 full-time equivalent employees globally. Our data
come from a dedicated web-based survey, designed by two of the au-
thors in conjunction with the ﬁrm. We analyse pooled data from this
ﬁrm in the UK that was collected in 2007 and 2010.
The ShareCo job satisfaction question is: “How satisﬁed are you in
your job?”, with responses recorded on a 5-point Likert scale where
1 = very dissatisﬁed and 5 = very satisﬁed. Importantly for our pur-
poses, the company operates an employee share purchase plan (ESPP)
that is central to its remuneration strategy.4 Initially we estimate
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ship and whether the worker is a salaried employee who is also paid
bonuses or commissions.We also include a control for theworker's per-
ceptions of the proportion of employees in thework-unit who belong to
the share plan. The X's are a set of individual-level demographic and job
characteristics, as listed in the footnote to Table 1.
We then add work-unit ﬁxed effects to each of the above OLS esti-
mates. These units identify groups of employees working in close prox-
imity to each other in that they work in the same ofﬁce and business
division or unit. The within work-unit regressions thus control for any
unobserved ﬁxed elements of the working environment that are corre-
lated with both plan participation (and other worker behaviour) and
job satisfaction.
3.2. Dataset 2: European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS)
Second, we consider the 2000/01 and 2005 waves of the European
Working Conditions Survey (EWCS) to see whether various forms of
performance pay are correlated with satisfaction with working
conditions.5 The EWCS surveys roughly 1000 employees per country
across 31 European countries, including all member countries of the
European Union. Our ﬁnal estimation sample is 33,510 after dropping
observations withmissing values on key variables andworkers who re-
port that they are single traders (i.e., in an organization where they are
the sole worker). We estimate variants of Eq. (2) with the dependent
variable coming from the responses to the question “On the whole, are
you very satisﬁed, satisﬁed, not very satisﬁed or not at all satisﬁed with
working conditions in your main paid job?”6 We always introduce coun-
try dummies to avoid any issues of the cross-country comparability of
ordinal subjective wellbeing measures: we thus present within-
country estimates. The EWCS oversamples workers in small countries,
but contains detailed weights to adjust for the relative likelihood of
workers appearing in the sample. All of our estimations use these
weights (although they do not actually affect our qualitative results).
In addition to being cross-country, the chief advantage of the EWCS is
its information on a number of separate payment schemes, the nature
of the job, and its hazards and risks. Below we use EWCS data to see
how payment methods are correlated with satisfaction with working
conditions, and whether share capitalism mediates the effect of bad
working conditions on employee satisfaction. We provide further de-
tails below and in the notes to Table 2.
3.3. Dataset 3: British Household Panel Survey (BHPS)
Our last dataset is the panel of British employees contained in the
BHPS, a general survey covering a random sample of approximately
10,000 individuals in 5500 British households per year, rising to ﬁgures
of 16,000 and 9000 respectively in later waves. The BHPS is a household
panel: all adults in the same household are interviewed separately.
We use 11 waves of the BHPS from 1998 to its cessation in this form
in 2008, as these years have consistent information on two forms of
performance-related pay, as follows:
In the last 12 months have you received any bonuses such as a Christmas
or quarterly bonus, proﬁt-related pay or proﬁt sharing bonus, or an occa-
sional commission? [this excludes overtimepayments]; andDoes your
pay include performance-related pay? (Taylor et al., 2006)
The answers to these two questions are used in turn to create
dummies for bonus/proﬁt-share receipt and other performance-
related pay receipt. Those who receive a bonus also report the annual
amount, so that we can see whether small contingent payments (such5 The 2010 EWCS lacks themore disaggregated payment-method information available
in the previous waves, and so we do not use it here.
6 This is the only satisfaction question in the EWCS.as Christmas bonuses) have only little effect onworker utility compared
to higher-powered bonuses. The data also include awide range of infor-
mation on individual and household demographics, health, labour-force
status, employment and values. There is both entry into and exit from
the panel, leading to an unbalanced data.
Our BHPS dependent variable is overall job satisfaction, from the
question: “All things considered, how satisﬁed or dissatisﬁed are you
with your present job overall using the same 1–7 scale?” The key advan-
tage of the BHPS is not only its ability to track individual workers over
time, but also its job histories data, which allows us to track individuals
in speciﬁc jobs over time. Following the approach outlined in Green and
Heywood (2015), we augment the standard job satisfactionmodel with
worker-job ﬁxed effects. In this waywe provide evidence of the effect of
performance-related pay on job satisfaction holding both individual and
work-speciﬁc characteristics constant.
3.4. Extensions
Having ﬁrst estimated the relationship between payment methods
and job satisfaction, we then turn to two potential explanatory chan-
nels. First, returning to ShareCo, we use information on organisational
loyalty and perceptions of fairness, both of whichmay be directly inﬂu-
enced by performance-related pay. The loyalty channel may especially
hold for schemes such as proﬁt sharing and share receipt, where one
aim is to make workers ‘part-owners’ of the ﬁrm and so view it as a
joint enterprise. Equally, perceptions of fair pay may arise if employees
believe they are more likely to be paid their marginal product in the
presence of performance-pay schemes. Organisational loyalty in
ShareCo is measured as the sum of the answers to three questions, all
measured on a ﬁve-point Likert scale running from “strongly agree”
(5) to “strongly disagree” (1): “I feel very loyal to this organization”,
“I ﬁnd that my values and the company's values are very similar” and
“Overall this company is a good place to work”. Our resulting attachment
scale runs from 3 (lowest) to 15 (highest), and has a scale-reliability co-
efﬁcient of 0.84. The fair-treatment scale is calculated analogously from
the answers to “I am fairly paid relative tomy ShareCo colleagues in a sim-
ilar job” and “I am fairly paid relative to employees with similar jobs in
other companies”, and has a reliability coefﬁcient of 0.75.7 We add
thesemeasures to Eq. (2) to see whether the effect of payment schemes
on job satisfaction works via loyalty and fairness.
Our second extension is to ask whether performance pay can miti-
gate the negative effects of bad working conditions: Do those with
poor working conditions react less negatively to them when they also
receive bonus and proﬁt-based payments? We ﬁrst examine this using
the wide range of cross-section information in the EWCS. We then
turn to BHPS panel data to provide within-job estimates. The BHPS
has less information on working conditions, and we here consider two
aspects of the job that might realistically be thought to be negative:
working unpaid overtime and commuting time.
4. Results
4.1. Share ownership, proﬁt-related pay and worker wellbeing
We ﬁrst ask whether workers with shares and other proﬁt-related
pay schemes report higher wellbeing. The ﬁrst row of Table 1 shows
that workers who are in the company share plan in ShareCo are more
satisﬁed with their jobs. This ﬁnding is robust to the inclusion of
work-unit ﬁxed effects, so the result is not driven by ﬁxed unobservable
differences across ofﬁce/business units affecting both satisfaction and
the individual's decision to join the share plan. It is also robust to condi-
tioning on log wages.7 =We consider the correlations between these ﬁve items via principal components
factor analysis with varimax rotation. The items loaded on the two dimensions used to
compute the scales described in the text with eigenfactors of 1.17 and 2.72 respectively.
Table 1
Job satisfaction, share plan membership and bonus commission in ShareCo.
Without wages With wages
OLS
Work-unit
ﬁxed effects OLS
Work-unit
ﬁxed effects
Member 0.228***
(0.049)
0.225***
(0.051)
0.235***
(0.050)
0.231***
(0.052)
% member 0.081***
(0.018)
0.085***
(0.019)
0.080***
(0.018)
0.084***
(0.019)
Commission 0.150**
(0.062)
0.118*
(0.066)
0.144**
(0.063)
0.114*
(0.067)
Adj. R2 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09
Notes:
(1) The membership dummy is based on the response to the question “Are you a member
of a ShareCo Share Plan?” The percent membership is based on the following question:
“What percentage of workers in your business unit do you think are members of the ShareCo
Share Plan?”with responses coded 1 = none, 2 = 1–19%, 3 = 20–39%, 4 = 40–59%, 5 =
60–79%, 6 = 80–99% and 7 = 100%. The item is entered linearly. The “Commission”
dummy is one of three dummies identifying contractual status, the others being hourly
paid and salaried without commission. The “Commission” coefﬁcient is evaluated against
the omitted category of “Salariedwithout bonus/commission”. The regressions contain an
intercept and the following controls: age (5 dummies); male; white; degree; professional
qualiﬁcation; household status (4 dummies); sociability scale; risk scale; majority of
household income is ShareCo earnings; occupation (7 dummies); supervisory status;
hoursworked (4 dummies); tenure (5 dummies); and a dummy for the year of the survey.
The sociability scale is an additive scale counting the number of times employees ticked a
box in response to the following question: “Doyou take part in the following activities, either
as part of your job or outside work? Please select as many as apply to you… member of a
trade/professional body or association; work in schools, colleges, universities; involved in
charities or voluntary bodies; member of a social, sports or arts club; active member of a
political party; active member of a religious group; socialising with co-workers outside of
work”. The risk scale is based on responses to the question “Are you generally a person
who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks?” where 1 =
“unwilling to take risks” and 10 = “fully prepared to take risks”.
(2) Sample N= 1887 without wages and 1846 with wages. The ﬁxed effects models ab-
sorb 54 work-unit dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate
statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 2
Satisfactionwithworking conditions and performance pay, EuropeanWorking Conditions
Survey (EWCS) 2000–2005, private-sector workers.
(I) (II) (III)
Piece rate −0.094***
(0.020)
−0.061***
(0.021)
−0.014
(0.020)
Proﬁt share 0.073***
(0.028)
0.081***
(0.026)
0.079***
(0.025)
Group bonus 0.026
(0.040)
0.029
(0.041)
−0.024
(0.039)
Share payment 0.103**
(0.048)
0.094*
(0.050)
0.14***
(0.050)
Observations 33,510 31,113 29,714
Adj. R2 0.097 0.126 0.245
Notes:
(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All estimates adjusted with population weights.
(2) Controls in model (I): an intercept, gender, age, age2, income and country
(31 dummies).
(3) (II) adds controls for occupation (9 dummies), industry (12 dummies) tenure, hours
worked, ﬂexible contract work and ﬁrm size.
(4) (III) adds controls for commutes more than 30 min each day, whether there are long
hours, whether work pace is set by colleagues, by the machine, by the boss or by targets,
worker experiences threats or discrimination at work, health or safety risks at work, num-
ber of hazards exposed to at work, shift work, repetitive work, monotonous work, night
shift, whether the worker can choose speed of work, order of work, or method of work,
presence of quality assessment, problem solving required, telework, homework, complex
tasks, task rotation, and the need for learning on the job.
Table 3
Incentive payments and job satisfaction, BHPS 1998–2008, private-sector workers.
(1) (3)
Pooled OLS
Worker-job match
ﬁxed effects
Ln wage (2001£) 0.12***
(0.017)
0.130***
(0.0128)
Performance pay −0.027
(0.020)
−0.015
(0.017)
Bonus/proﬁt share 0.074***
(0.015)
0.068***
(0.013)
Observations 48,045 48,045
Adj. R2 0.050 0.045
Number of worker-job matches 1976
Notes:
(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(2) Column (1) includes an intercept and controls formale, age, age2,marital status, health
status, A-level, diploma, degree or higher, union coverage, large ﬁrm (200+), promotion
opportunities, employer-funded pension, industry (9dummies), occupation (9 dummies),
and region (11 dummies).
(3) Column (2) omits the time-invariant controls.
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ShareCo employees' job satisfaction also rises with the percentage of
their peers who they think belong to the company share plan (Table 1,
row 2). The result is robust to the inclusion of work-unit ﬁxed effects.
There is thus a positivewellbeing spillover from co-workers' share own-
ership. An interaction term between own membership status and per-
ceptions of peers' membership (not shown) attracted a statistically
insigniﬁcant estimated coefﬁcient, so the size of the spillover is similar
for members and non-members. The implication is that members and
non-members value the positive externality they receive from col-
leagues' share plan membership to a similar degree. These externalities
might include hard working on the part of colleagues, or simply being
surrounded by reciprocating types even if you yourself are not one of
them. There is no reason to think that non-members would value
these sorts of externalities less than their colleagues who were in the
plan.
The third row of Table 1 shows that workers with bonuses and com-
missions, i.e. whose pay is partly tied to results, report higher job satis-
faction. However, this effect shrinks and becomes less precise once we
condition on work-unit ﬁxed effects. Part of this positive association
then reﬂects work-unit level variation in the use of commissions.
We now estimate similar regressions for the cross-European data
over 31 countries in the 2000/2001 and 2005 waves of the EWCS.
While we cannot control for work units in the EWCS, we do have
highly-detailed information on workplace characteristics, tasks and
hazards—many of which are likely to be correlatedwith the use of per-
formance pay. Table 2 shows the effect of four different, non-mutually
exclusive payment types with an increasingly complete control vector.
All models incorporate country ﬁxed effects so that we present
within-country estimates. Model (1) contains an intercept term and
four dummy variables for different types of performance pay, along
with income, gender and age. Here there is a negative effect of piecerates on job satisfaction, no effect of group bonuses and positive effects
from share payments and proﬁt shares. Model (2) adds a rich array of
controls for occupation, industry, tenure, hours, ﬂexible employment
contracts andﬁrm size,whilemodel (3) includes controls for autonomy,
task type, work hazards, shift work etc., as detailed in the notes to
Table 2. These inclusions substantially improve the ﬁt of the model,
and the positive relationships between job satisfaction, on the one
hand, and proﬁt sharing and share payments on the other continue to
hold. However, the estimated coefﬁcient on piece rates becomes insig-
niﬁcant as we add controls, suggesting that the initial negative relation-
ship reﬂected the type of jobs and working conditions in which piece
rates are used.
Last we turn to evidence from the 1998–2008 waves of the BHPS.
Table 3 shows the relationship between the receipt of the two types of
performance pay in the BHPS, ﬁrst in pooled regressions and then
panel estimates holding within-job and within-worker characteristics
constant. As in the EWCS in Table 2, there is no statistically-signiﬁcant
Table 5
Job satisfaction, share-plan membership and bonuses in ShareCo: the role of loyalty and
fairness.
OLS FE
Member 0.113***
(0.039)
0.105***
(0.042)
% member 0.029**
(0.015)
0.032**
(0.016)
Commission 0.047
(0.048)
0.052
(0.052)
Log wage −0.021
(0.017)
−0.021
(0.019)
Loyalty 0.230***
(0.009)
0.228***
(0.009)
Fairness 0.041***
(0.011)
0.040***
(0.012)
Adj. R2 0.42 0.42
Notes:
(1) The models contain controls described in the notes to Table 1, and additive scales for
organisational commitment and perceptions of fair pay. See the text for details.
(2) Sample N = 1846. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statis-
tical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
156 A. Bryson et al. / Labour Economics 42 (2016) 151–158relationship between individual performance pay and job satisfaction.
However, bonus receipt and proﬁt sharing are associated with higher
job satisfaction, and are robust to the introduction of job-worker ﬁxed
effects: for a given worker in a given job, the switch to bonuses/proﬁt
shares leads to increased job satisfaction, holding wages constant.
The BHPS data also includes the amount of the bonus/proﬁt share,
which we add to the models above. The main motivation for doing so
is looking for potential non-linearities in bonus size, such as negative ef-
fects of small bonuses on worker behaviour (Gneezy and Rustichini,
2000). In the ﬁrst two columns of Table 4 the bonus/proﬁt share receipt
dummy is replaced by the amount of the bonus: job satisfaction rises
with bonus size in both the pooled and within worker-job panel esti-
mates. The quadratic bonus term in column 3 reveals that there is a
non-linear effect. To explore further, we re-estimate the model in col-
umn 4 with an indicator for small or large bonus payments (greater or
less than £1000).While large bonuses are, perhaps naturally, associated
with the greatest job satisfaction, there is no evidence of a negative ef-
fect of smaller bonuses on worker wellbeing.
To summarise, there is a strong positive association between share-
capitalist approaches to payment and job satisfaction. This is true across
a variety of institutional settings, including cross-Europe, within ﬁrm
and across Britain. Moreover, using a variety of data we have demon-
strated how this result is robust to approaches that identify within-
workplace and within worker-job effects. Taken together, we have a
body of evidence that suggests that the introduction of group-based
performance-payment methods such as share ownership and proﬁt
sharing increase worker wellbeing. In our subsequent analysis we
seek to examine, in turn, two possible channels through which group-
payment receipt may positively affect worker wellbeing: (1) gift ex-
change and (2) wage compensation for bad working conditions.4.2. Does gift exchange account for the wellbeing effects of share-plan
participation?
Table 5 replicates the ShareCo analysis in the last two columns of
Table 1 but now adds controls for organisational loyalty and perceptions
of fair pay. We can see if the association between share-plan participa-
tion and job satisfaction is driven by more favourable views of theTable 4
Job satisfaction and bonus size, BHPS 1998–2008.
(1) (2) (3) (3)
OLS Worker-
match FE
Worker-match
FE + bonus2
Small & large
bonuses
Ln wage (2001£) 0.115***
(0.017)
0.126***
(0.013)
0.120***
(0.013)
0.120***
(0.013)
Performance pay −0.013
(0.019)
−0.004
(0.017)
−0.009
(0.017)
−0.023
(0.017)
Real bonus (£'000 s) 0.005**
(0.002)
0.006***
(0.001)
0.013***
(0.001)
Real bonus2 (£1 M) −0.00002***
(0.000005)
Bonus b £1000 0.020
(0.015)
Bonus ≥ £1000 0.173***
(0.020)
Observations 48,111 48,111 48,111 48,111
Adj. R2 0.050 0.045 0.046 0.046
Number of worker-
job matches
1976 1976 1976
Notes:
(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(2) The OLS models include an intercept and controls for male, age, age2, marital status,
health status, A-level, diploma, degree or higher, union coverage, large ﬁrm (200+), pro-
motion opportunities, employer-funded pension, industry (9 dummies), occupation (9
dummies), and region (11 dummies). The worker-match FE models (2–4) omit the
time-invariant controls.ﬁrm, as might be the case if plan participants feel that the plan repre-
sents gift-exchange. Wages are insigniﬁcant here, but the estimated co-
efﬁcients on organisational loyalty and perceived fair pay are positive,
large and statistically signiﬁcant: the models here account for roughly
two-ﬁfths of the variance in job satisfaction, compared to only around
one-tenth in Table 1. Furthermore, the introduction of these new vari-
ables reduces the plan membership coefﬁcient by one-half, while the
coefﬁcient for the perception of peers' membership falls markedly. It
therefore appears that a considerable part of the plan-membership ef-
fect stems from greater organisational loyalty and a heightened percep-
tion of pay fairness. Individual plan membership continues to remain
statistically signiﬁcant in most of the models, so that these channels
do not account for the entire association.
We also estimate models that include feelings of co-ownership.8 The
feeling of co-ownership is positively associated with plan membership,
and strongly positively correlated with job satisfaction. Its introduction
reduces the plan-membership coefﬁcient by roughly half in the job-
satisfaction equations. The membership dummy remains statistically
signiﬁcant, albeit only at the 90% conﬁdence level. This continues to be
the case when organisational loyalty and perceptions of fair pay are
also added to the model, though it becomes statistically non-
signiﬁcant in the ﬁxed effects model. Perceptions of co-ownership thus
clearlymatter for the job satisfaction of ShareCo employees, and account
for a sizeable part of the plan-membership effect, but not all of it.4.3. Do share-capitalist payment methods dampen the negative effects of
poor working conditions on employee job satisfaction?
Using the EWCS and BHPS we ask whether tying employee remu-
neration to ﬁrm or group performance makes a difference to the way
in which employees respond to bad working conditions.
Table 6 reports EWCS results akin to those in Table 2, but this time
splitting the sample into those who receive some form of share-
capitalist pay – income from share ownership in their ﬁrm, proﬁt-
sharing or group-based performance-related pay – and those who
do not. The table presents a selection of coefﬁcients related to work
conditions which can be considered as unpleasant and are likely to re-
duce job satisfaction.9 While the coefﬁcients are similar for many job8 Employeeswere asked to rate themselves on a scale of 1 to 10 in response to the ques-
tion “How much do you feel like a co-owner of this company?” The models are presented in
Appendix Table A1.
9 We focus on a subset of these characteristics. The fullmodels are reported as Appendix
Table A2.
Table 7
Incentive pay, job satisfaction and job disamenities, BHPS 1998–2008.
Pooled OLS Worker-job FE
Ln wage (2001£) 0.0848***
(0.0142)
0.0877***
(0.0146)
0.100***
(0.0117)
0.102***
(0.0121)
Performance-related pay −0.0229
(0.0190)
−0.0177
(0.0195)
−0.0129
(0.0166)
−0.0061
(0.0171)
Bonus/proﬁt share 0.0535***
(0.0157)
0.0444**
(0.0216)
Unpaid overtime hours −0.0045**
(0.0022)
−0.0031*
(0.0018)
Commute time (min) −0.0023***
(0.0004)
−0.0019***
(0.0003)
Bonus/proﬁt share ∗ unpaid
overtime hours
0.0057*
(0.0030)
0.0064**
(0.0025)
Bonus/proﬁt share ∗
commute time (min)
0.0009
(0.0006)
0.0001*
(0.0005)
Observations 52,219 49,895 52,219 49,895
Adj. R2 0.063 0.064 0.056 0.058
Number of worker-job
matches
1782 1760
Notes:
(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(2) OLSmodels include an intercept and controls for male, age, age2, marital status, health
status, A-level, diploma, degree or higher, union coverage, large ﬁrm (200+), promotion
opportunities, employer-funded pension, industry (9dummies), occupation (9 dummies),
and region (11 dummies). Worker-match FE models omit time-invariant controls.
Table 6
Impact of “bad”working conditions on satisfaction with working conditions among those
with and without share capitalist types of compensation (proﬁt shares or share owner-
ship). EWCS, 2000–2005, private-sector workers.
(1) (2)
With share
capitalism
Without share
capitalism
Commute N 30 min −0.0366
(0.0363)
−0.0250*
(0.0142)
10+ hours at least once per month 0.0507
(0.0499)
−0.0249
(0.0205)
Work to tight deadlines −0.0391
(0.0419)
−0.0882***
(0.0178)
Pace set by colleagues −0.0587
(0.0389)
−0.0412***
(0.0147)
Pace set by targets −0.0317
(0.0389)
−0.0420***
(0.0158)
Pace set by machines 0.0689
(0.0504)
0.0201
(0.0200)
Pace set by Boss −0.0221
(0.0397)
−0.0606***
(0.0152)
Number of types of threat/discrimination −0.0814***
(0.0254)
−0.135***
(0.0130)
Health or safety at risk at work −0.317***
(0.0466)
−0.359***
(0.0173)
Number of hazards exposed to −0.0214**
(0.00941)
−0.0176***
(0.00405)
Shift work −0.0965*
(0.0539)
−0.0315
(0.0207)
Repetitive tasks −0.0558
(0.0397)
0.00140
(0.0153)
Monotonous tasks −0.109***
(0.0395)
−0.158***
(0.0153)
Night shift 0.0443
(0.0538)
−0.00877
(0.0226)
High speed −0.0827*
(0.0429)
−0.0641***
(0.0165)
Observations 3053 26,661
Adj. R2 0.282 0.245
Notes:
(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(2) Additional controls: an intercept, gender, age, age2, income, country (31dummies), oc-
cupation (9 dummies), industry (12dummies), wages, tenure, hoursworked,ﬂexible con-
tract work and ﬁrm size, whether the worker can choose speed of work, order of work, or
method of work, presence of quality assessment, problem solving required, telework,
homework, complex tasks, task rotation, and the need for learning on the job.
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be more tolerant of a range of negative working conditions.10 For
instance, share-capitalist workers are not negatively affected by
commuting, by having the pace of their work set by the boss, their
colleagues, or by targets. There are similar results for having to work
to tight deadlines. Share-capitalist workers also have a more muted
negative response to threats and discrimination through work. There
is essentially no difference in response to health or safety being at risk
at work or the number of hazards to which the worker is exposed.
These effects emerge despite the fact that the model controls directly
for wages. Hence, these results provide some support for the proposi-
tion that share-capitalist workers are more forgiving of bad working
conditions.
These EWCS results are also found in BHPS panel data, where we
consider unpaid overtime hours and travel to work time (minutes).
We estimate the negative effect of these two working conditions on
job satisfaction, and then introduce interactions to see whether this ef-
fect is mitigated by bonus/proﬁt shares receipt. The ﬁrst two columns of
Table 7 refer to pooled OLS estimates. Both unpaid overtime hours and
commuting time reduce overall job satisfaction, and in both cases the
interaction term with bonus/proﬁt share receipt is positive, although it10 Appendix Table A3 provides sample means for these work conditions.is only statistically signiﬁcant in the case of unpaid overtime hours.
The size of the estimated coefﬁcients in column 1 implies that unpaid
overtime hours signiﬁcantly reduce satisfaction, but only for those
who do not receive incentive payments. Columns 3 and 4 show the re-
sults holding worker-job ﬁxed effects constant: these are very similar,
although the interaction term between bonus/proﬁt share and com-
muting time is now statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level. In essence,
being in receipt of a bonus/proﬁt share appears to substantially mute
the negative consequences of these work disamenities on job satisfac-
tion, and this continues to be the case even in our estimates holding
job-matches constant. As a result, they do not seem to result from either
unobservableworker or job characteristics that jointly inﬂuence job sat-
isfaction, working conditions and payment type.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we show that worker wellbeing is inﬂuenced by
how compensation is determined. Those in receipt of group-
performance bonuses or proﬁt shares, and those in share-ownership
schemes, have higher job satisfaction than do other employees, condi-
tional on their wages. These ﬁndings hold across three quite different
data sets and are robust to the inclusion of work-unit ﬁxed effects in
the ShareCo data, detailed job controls in the EWCS data, and individual
ﬁxed effects in the BHPS panel data. In the ShareCo data, the perceived
participation of co-workers in the share plan has an additional positive
impact on individual job satisfaction, regardless of their own share-plan
membership status.
We investigate two channels through which these ‘share capitalist’
modes of pay produce positive worker outcomes. First, in a single-ﬁrm
setting, we ﬁnd that about half of the share-capitalism effect can be
accounted for by employees' feelings of reciprocity in return for the
‘gift’ of share capitalism. Second, in broader survey data we show that
these payment methods dampen, or in some cases entirely wipe out,
thenegativewellbeing effects ofwhatwe typically thinkof as badwork-
ing conditions.
Although our results are suggestive of a causal link between group
performance pay and employee job satisfaction, one which accords
with various theories about what might make employees happy, our
analyses cannot deﬁnitively conﬁrm a causal linkage. We encourage
those engaged in ﬁeld experiments randomly determining employee
158 A. Bryson et al. / Labour Economics 42 (2016) 151–158exposure to different payment systems to collect outcome data relating
to employee wellbeing alongside the data on productivity and ﬁrm per-
formance that is more commonly collected.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2016.09.002.
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